This paper extends the existing theoretical literature on buy-price auctions to the case when the bidders can observe dropouts. In that case when some bidders leave the auction, the remaining bidders have to update their information and change the threshold auction price at which they are willing to buy out accordingly. We explicitly model the information-updating process during auction and the implied recursive nature of the optimal buy-out strategy. Using a recursive equation linking the value functions for n-and (n + 1)-bidder cases, we completely characterize the symmetric dynamic optimal buy-out strategy. It is shown that the bidders will postpone buy-out (by waiting until the auction price is higher) when some of them drop out.
Introduction
Recently, there has been substantial progress in our understanding of the buy-price online auctions. The earlier literature has emphasized how bidders' degrees of risk-aversion affects their strategies and the outcome of bidding. 1 Recent research has been focusing on characterizing the equilibrium strategy (of both bidders and sellers) and its outcome.
Under general assumptions on utility function and distribution of bidders' valuations, A common feature of all the literature above is that there is no bidders dropout or, equivalently, bidders cannot observe it, when the standing price rises above the levels some are willing to pay and thus they leave the auction. An important consequence of 1 See, e.g., Budish and Takeyama, 2001 ; Mathews and Katzman, (2006) . 2 A Yahoo!-type buy-price auction is one that allows the bidders to obtain the item by paying the buy-price throughout the auction. In contrast, in an eBay-type auction, bidders have this option only before the auction starts. Once bidders start to bid, this option is revoked.
this assumption is that the bidder's buy-out strategy will remain the same throughout the auction. This is an assumption that greatly simplifies the derivation of the equilibrium strategy, as it will then be unnecessary to consider the information-updating process (and thus the reaction of the remaining bidders) when some of the bidders drop out. However, in a standard English auction this is an important issue because, unlike the sealed-bid auction, its nature is dynamic. A bidder will remain active only if the prevailing price is lower than his valuation, and will drop out as soon as the price rises above it. When that happens, new information is revealed and the behavior of the remaining bidders should change accordingly. Because the literature assumes that the bidders are unaware when some of them drop out, there is no need for this informational update and the change of strategy implied by it. The equilibrium derived is therefore a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, but not subgame perfect.
Specifically, since buy-out is essentially adopted by the seller to intensify the competition between the bidders, the latter are less prone to buy out when the number of bidders decreases.
3 This implies that, other things being equal, when a certain bidder drops out, the remaining bidders will optimally raise the standing price at which they are willing to buy out. More importantly, when timing his optimal buy-out strategy, a bidder must calculate the case when some bidders drop out as one of its contingencies. As a result, the bidder's optimal buy-out strategy must be inter-linked with that of all the subgames with fewer bidders.
4
To give a concrete example of our argument above, consider an auction with four bidders. When deriving the optimal buy-out strategy, a bidder must take into consideration the possibility that one bidder drops out before the item is sold (which occurs with positive probability). Under that case his expected payoff will be the equilibrium payoff in the 3-bidder auction. However, as is argued above, since a bidder will have different buy-out strategies in the 3-bidder case and 4-bidder cases, optimal buy-out strategy for the latter will depend on that of the former. Therefore, there should be an equation linking the optimal buy-out strategy in the 4-bidder case with that of the 3-bidder case.
By the same logic, the optimal strategy of the 3-bidder case should also depend on that of the 2-bidder case. Consequently, the optimal buy-out strategy should be recursively derived. This dynamic structure has not been captured in the previous literature, and in this sense the previous models have been static ones. They essentially assumes that regardless of their valuations, every bidder believes that all his opponents will stay active until the item is sold.
We need to emphasize that a model which assumes no dropout might not be unreasonable for the on-line auctions, as it is indeed impossible to observe drop-outs. As a result, our model should be viewed as an extension of the existing model to the dynamic context, when the number of bidders is observable, rather than as a more general model for online auction with buy-price. However, even in an online auction, to assume that the number of bidders is constant throughout the auction is only a convenient approximation.
A complete model for the case when number of bidders is unobservable should specify a (joint) distribution function for all possible valuations of the bidders. For each possible configuration of valuations a bidder derives the optimal buy-out strategy. For example, if a bidder believes that bidder i valuation is v i , then he should act as if bidder i has dropped out when the price rises above v i , even if he cannot observe it. His strategy should then be the optimal response to the expected value of all the possible configurations considered.
Understandably, this results in very complicated computation that is almost impossible to solve.
In this paper we build up a dynamic auction model with buy-out by explicitly taking into consideration the information updating process during auction, and the recursive nature of buy-out strategy implied by this consideration. We derive a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the bidders, together with a recursive equation to facilitate its computation. Well after the paper was completed, we were made aware of a similar paper by Klumpp and Ranger (2006) . They also consider buy-price auctions with observable dropouts and characterize the symmetric equilibrium. The differences between our model and theirs are as follows. First, their model is more general in their assumption on the bidder's utility function and the distribution of bidder's valuations. In the case when more than one bidder proposes buy-out, they assume that each wins with equal probability; while we assume the bidder with highest valuation wins. Our model is more general in the assumption on the seller's utility, which they assume is risk-neutral while we assume it can be either risk-averse or risk-neutral. Because we impose more stringent assumptions on bidders' utilities and valuations, we can solve for a closed-form solution of the optimal strategy. More importantly, our derivation is very intuitive, which enables us to see clearly the trade-off involved when a bidder considers when to buy out, and how the optimal strategy balances this trade-off.
The Model
The model we consider is essentially the same as in Chen et. al. (2006) . In order to concentrate on the issue raised in the Introduction, we will impose several simplifying assumptions which strip away the complications that are irrelevant to our argument. to buy out simultaneously, we assume that the one who has higher valuation will win (in buy-out). This assumption not only greatly simplifies our calculation but also affords a closed-form solution of the optimal buy-out strategy. 5 Fourth, we assume that there is no reservation price or, equivalently, the reservation price is 0. 
An Example of the 3-bidder Case
Since the optimal buy-out strategy must be recursively derived, in order to solve for the optimal buy-out strategy for the 3-bidder case, we must first solve for that of the 2-bidder case. 7 Even with a buy-out price, a basic result of the standard English auction remains true: The bidders will stay active in the auction as long as the standing price is lower than his valuation of the object. The complication comes from the fact that, at every 5 For justification and consequence of this assumption, please see Chen et. al. (2006) . 6 The model can be easily extended to the case with reservation price. 7 The solution of the two-bidder case has been discussed in Chen et. al. (2006) . We include this discussion here for the sake of completeness.
prevailing price, now he has the additional option to pre-empt his opponent by buying the objective immediately at the buy-out price v b .
Given v b , let p 2 (v) be the buy-out strategy of the bidder whose valuation of the objective is v.
8 That is, a bidder who values the object at v is willing to buy out the object (by paying v b ) when the prevailing price reaches p 2 (v). Since the greater the value of v, the more willing is the bidder to obtain the object immediately by paying v b , we know that 8 The subscript 2 is to denote the 2-bidder case.
Consider the decision of a bidder (whose valuation is v) at the moment when the prevailing price is p < v. If he buys the object immediately with buy-out price v b , his
If instead he holds out and waits until price is p + dp to buy out the object, then he will face three possible outcomes. First, his opponent buys out the object while he waits. Second, his opponent drops out between p and p + dp.
Third, neither of the above happens so that he eventually buys out the object when the prevailing price is p + dp. Whether the bidder should buy the object immediately (by paying v b ), or waits until p + dp, depends on the difference of the utility between an immediate buy-out and the combined expected utility under the three possible outcomes of waiting until p + dp. 
then his opponent will buy out the object while he waits. This is the first outcome we mentioned above, which occurs with probability
, and his utility is 0. Similarly, if his opponent's valuation lies in [p, p + dp], then his opponent will drop out while he waits, and he will win the bidding with price p. This is the second outcome mentioned, which occurs with probability dp v−p , and his utility is (v − p) α /α. Under the third outcome, which occurs with probability The total expected utility of waiting until p + dp to buy out is thus dp
The total change in utility of waiting until p + d p to buy out, instead of buying out now, is thus
For the function v 2 (p) to be the optimal buy-out strategy, it must be the case that du dp = 0, i.e., the first-order condition must hold at every p. This implies that
Let
, and equation (3) becomes
Since
10 the solution of (4) must pass through (x, y) = (0, 0). It is difficult to directly solve for equation (4) , but this boundary condition and the fact that (4) is homogeneous of degree α on both sides suggest that the solution is linear. We thus let x = µy, then (4) becomes
Denote µ 2 as the solution of (5). It is easy to see that µ 2 exists and is unique. Moreover, µ 2 ≥ 1 and that µ 2 is decreasing in α. We thus have x = µ 2 y. Substituting for
The function v 2 (p) is the explicit form of the inverse of a bidder's optimal buy-out strategy.
Solving for the inverse of the function v 2 (p) we have
The function p 2 (v) is exactly the optimal buy-out strategy of the bidder. It shows that a bidder, whose valuation of the object is v, will be willing to buy out the object (by paying v b ) when the prevailing price reaches
Given the optimal buy-out policy, the optimal strategy of the bidder with valuation v is then easy to describe: Stay active as long as the prevailing price is lower than p 2 (v), and buy it out as soon as price reaches p 2 (v). Note that since a bidder will consider buying out only if v > v b , we know
That is, if a bidder will buy out the object, then he will do so before the price reaches his valuation. This also implies that the transaction price cannot be higher than v b . In other words, by setting v b as the buy-out price, the seller essentially sets v b as the upper-bound for possible transaction prices.
For the 2-bidder case, the optimal strategies derived in Hidvegi et al. (2006) and Reynolds and Wooders (2006) are also subgame perfect, as the game will end whenever one bidder drops out. When controlled for differences in the assumptions on distribution and utility functions, the differential equations in their papers (Theorem 1 in the former;
Proposition 3 in the latter) will be the same as equation (3).
The expected utility of a bidder having valuation v (when the prevailing price is p < v b )
under the optimal buy-out strategy, p 2 (v), is thus
where the first term is the bidder's expected utility when his opponent buys out before him; the second term is his expected utility when his opponent's valuation is greater than p 2 (v) (but smaller than v) so that he wins by buy-out; the third term is his expected utility when his opponent drops out before price reaches p 2 (v), in that case he wins the item by paying the opponent's valuation. Straightforward calculation shows that
With this we can now proceed to the 3-bidder case. Let p 3 (v) be the buy-out strategy, and v 3 (p) its inverse. If instead of following p 3 (v) the bidder delays and waits until p 3 (v) + dp to buy out, then his potential gain is that one of his opponents might drop out during this delay. In that case his expected utility is U 2 (v, p). The case that both opponents drop out is of second-order, and can be ignored. Therefore his net gain of delay to buy out is
Since this occurs with probability
his expected net gain is 2dp
On the other hand, the potential loss of delay is that one of his opponents buys out the object during p and p + dp, in that case his loss is (v − v b ) α /α. 11 Since this occurs with
2 , the expected loss of delay is
That p 3 (v) is optimal means that the expected gain equals expected loss, i.e., first-order condition for p 3 (v) must hold at every p. Consequently, by plugging in the value of v 2 (v, p) and making equation (12) equal to (13), we have the following differential equation:
where
. Let y = v − v b and x = v b − p, then dy = dv and dx = −dp. As a result,
Equation (14) then becomes:
This equation is homogeneous of degree 0 in x and y. Moreover, it passes through the point (x, y) = (0, 0). Again, a natural conjecture for the solution (15) is that x = µy, where µ is a constant. In that case equation (15) becomes
) by the definition of µ 2 . We have shown > α. As a result, A < 0. Moreover, it can be easily seen that B < 1. Equation (16) is thus plotted in Figure 2 . Obviously, there exists a unique 11 Similarly, the probability that both opponents buy out is of second-order, and can be ignored.
solution of for (16), µ 3 , and it is in inverse relation with α. The solution for (15) is thus Equation (17) is exactly the same as equation (6), except that the values of µ 2 and µ 3 are different. In fact, we can further show that µ 3 > µ 2 . For this we only have to prove
Plugging the values of A and B into the left-hand-side of (18), we have
The fact that µ 3 > µ 2 implies that the threshold price to buy out is different in the 2-bidder and the 3-bidder cases. More importantly, since both p 3 (v) and p 2 (v) are defined over [v b ,v] , and that p 3 (v b ) = p 2 (v b ), the threshold price to buy out for a bidder is lower in the 3-bidder case than in the 2-bidder case (i.e., p 3 v] ). This in turn implies that when one of the bidders drops out, the remaining bidders will respond by raising their threshold auction prices at which they are willing buy out. Put differently, when some bidder drops out, the remaining bidders will wait until the prevailing price is higher than they had planned (in the 3-bidder case) in order to buy out. The expected utility of a bidder with valuation v, when prevailing price is p, is thus
where v (i) is the order statistic for a bidder with the i-th lowest valuation in the 2-bidder case.
The General Case
In the general case when there are n bidders, let p n (v) be the buy-out strategy of the bidders, and v n (p) its inverse function. Under the buy-out strategy
be the expected utility of a bidder whose valuation of the item is v, calculated at the prevailing price p.
There is a recursive relation between the "value functions" U n and U n−1 . Specifically, consider a bidder whose valuation is v. Then if the prevailing price is p, there are three components for U n (v, p) (see Figure 3) . In the figure, v (n−1) and v (1) denote the order statistic of the maximum and minimum valuation among n − 1 bidders, respectively.
Since v (n−1) is always greater than v (1) , we only have to consider the area above the 45 0 line.
In region E 1 , since v (n−1) > v and p n (v (1) ) > v (1) , his opponent who has the highest valuation will win before the one having the lowest valuation drops out. In this case his utility is 0. In region E 2 , since v > v (n−1) and p n (v) < v (1) , the bidder will buy out the item before any of his opponents drop out. In this case his utility is −1) ). In this case, the lowest-valuation bidder (having valuation v (1) ) will leave before anyone buys out. Consequently, his utility is the expected utility of the (n − 1)-bidder game, evaluated at the price when the lowestvaluation drops out (which is v (1) ), U n−1 (v, v (1) ). Thus U n (v, p) can be written recursively as
We can now derive the differential equation characterizing the optimal buy-out strategy. Suppose the bidder delays his buy-out from p n (v) to p n (v) + dp. Then, similar to the reasoning of the 3-bidder case, his expected gain is
His expected loss is
That p n (v) is the optimal means that the sum of gain and loss is 0, i.e.,
This is the differential equation for the optimal buy-out strategy p n (v). It is instructive to compare our differential equation (25) with that in Theorem 1 of Hidvegi et. al. (2006) which, under the assumptions we impose, reduces to
The only difference between (25) and (26) is the numerator of the first term. In Hidvegi et al. (2006), since a bidder cannot observe drop-out while he delays buy-out, it is only if all his opponents leave before price reaches his buy-out price p n (v), that the uncertainty is resolved and he is sure of winning the bidding, which gives him a utility of
. In our model, however, since the bidder is aware when certain bidder drops out, the benefit of delay is the expected payoff after one of the bidders leaves, U n−1 (v, p).
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We can now state our main theorem.
Theorem. For any n ≥ 2, there exists, for the n-bidder auction, a unique perfect
Bayesian buy-out equilibrium In order to prove the theorem, we use induction on the number of bidders, n. We separate the proof into three lemmas.
Lemma 1. If in the n-bidder case the optimal buy-out strategy is linear in the form of
and (v − p) of the form of equation (27), then the same must also be true for U n+1 (v, p) in the (n + 1)-bidder case.
where c n (·) and c n,i (·) are all functions of µ 2 , · · · , µ n , for i = 0, · · · , n − 2.
Note that both U 3 (v, p) and U 2 (v, p) are in the form of (27).
Then v − p = x + y, dv = dy and dp = −dx. By our previous argument, the differential equation for the optimal buy-out strategy in the (n + 1)-bidder case is
Plugging (27) into (28), and substitutive for x and y, we have
This is a homogeneous differential equation which passes through (x, y) = (0, 0). Again conjecturing that x = µy and substitute it into (29), we have an equation for µ:
Let the solution be µ n+1 . (For existence and uniqueness of µ n+1 , see Lemmas 2 and 3.)
We thus have
Given that p n+1 (v) is a linear function, we can now show that
, and is in the form of (27):
Plugging (30) and (31) into (21), and after laborious calculation, we have
Obviously, U n+1 (v, p), c n+1 , c n+1,0 and c n+1,i (i ≥ 1) are all in the forms we have claimed.
Lemma 2. Let {p
be the equilibrium buy-out strategy in the n-bidder case. Then in the (n + 1)-bidder case, there exists µ n+1 > µ n such that
is the optimal buy-out strategy.
Proof. Rewriting (30), the equation for the solution of µ n+1 becomes
Define the left-hand-side of (36) as f n+1 (µ). Then using the recursive relation for c n and c n−1,i 's, it can be rewritten as
It is easy to see that
Finally, we show the uniqueness of µ n+1 . First note that the right-hand side of (36) is decreasing in µ. Second, the buy-out strategy
Third, the more bidders there are, the more competitive the auction is, and thus the more willing the bidders will be to buy out the item. In other words, the prevailing price at which a bidder is willing to buy out will be lower when there are more bidders, which in turn implies that µ n is increasing in n. Finally, f n+1 (µ n ) = 1 < 1 + 1 µ n . Together, these four facts imply that in order to show that µ n+1 is unique, it suffices to show that the left-hand-side of (36), i.e., f n+1 (µ), is increasing in µ for all µ ≥ µ n .
Proof. It is straightforward to show (using the definition of f n+1 (µ)) that
As a result, in order to show that f n+1 (µ) > 0 for µ ≥ µ n , it suffices to prove that
The proof is rather straightforward but computationally tedious, and we relegate it to the appendix.
Combining the results in Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 we thus complete proof of the theorem.
To summarize, we have shown in Section 2.2 that any optimal buy-out strategy must satisfy (25). Since v 2 (p, v) and p 2 (v) satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 1, using introduction on n and the results in Lemmas 1 and 2 we know that there exists an optimal buy-out strategy
for all n ≥ 2. Finally, Lemma 3 shows that the optimal buy-out strategy is unique.
Conclusion
This paper derives the equilibrium strategy of the bidder in an English auction with buyout. Unlike the previous literature, we assume that during the auction the bidders can observe dropouts of their opponents. In this case, the bidders' strategies will become substantially more complicated, because they need to update their information (and thus modify their strategies accordingly) whenever a bidder drops out of auction. Under the assumptions imposed on the density function of the bidders' valuations and their utilities, we are able to characterize the equilibrium strategies in closed-form solution. The equilibrium strategy is shown to be a function of a bidder's own valuation and the number of active bidders. Moreover, a bidder will respond to dropout of opponents by delaying his buy-out timing. The assumptions we need to impose in order to derive closed-form solution, however, are relatively stringent. In particular, we assume that the bidders' valuations are uniformly distributed, and that both the bidders and the sellers exhibit constant degree of risk-aversion. It will be of theoretical interest to see how our results can extend to a more general context. 
µ(1 + µ)
In (41), (42) and (44),μ n ∈ (µ n , µ).
Using equations (39) 
Again we will prove our result by using induction in n. As a starting point for our induction on n, we need to show that f 3 (µ) is increasing for all µ > µ 3 . Using the definition in (36) and the facts that c 2 = µ 2 /(1 + α)(1 + µ 2 ) and c 2,0 = µ 2 − µ 2 (1 + µ 2 ) α /(1 + α), we know that f 3 (µ) =µ
where the last equality comes from the fact that (1 + µ 2 ) α = 1 + 1 µ 2 .
